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Abstract
An influenza pandemic threatens to be the most lethal public health
crisis to confront the world. Physicians will have critical roles in
diagnosis, containment and treatment of influenza, and their
commitment to treat despite increased personal risks is essential
for a successful public health response. The obligations of the
medical profession stem from the unique skills of its practitioners,
who are able to provide more effective aid than the general public
in a medical emergency. The free choice of profession and the
societal contract from which doctors derive substantial benefits
affirm this commitment. In hospitals, the duty will fall upon
specialties that are most qualified to deal with an influenza
pandemic, such as critical care, pulmonology, anesthesiology and
emergency medicine. It is unrealistic to expect that this obligation
to treat should be burdened with unlimited risks. Instead, risks
should be minimized and justified against the effectiveness of
interventions. Institutional and public cooperation in logistics,
remuneration and psychological/ legal support may help remove
the barriers to the ability to treat. By stepping forward in duty
during such a pandemic, physicians will be able to reaffirm the
ethical center of the profession and lead the rest of the healthcare
team in overcoming the medical crisis.
Introduction
As the specter of an influenza pandemic looms, preparation is
underway to cope with what may be the most lethal public
health crisis to confront the world [1]. By virtue of their
training and expertise, doctors will have a pivotal role in a
successful response to a pandemic in the areas of detection,
containment and treatment [2]. A commitment by physicians
is needed to ensure that this role will be fulfilled despite the
presence of an elevated level of personal risk arising from
exposure to contagious influenza patients.
The obligation to render treatment in the presence of
increased risks needs to be first justified as legitimate.
Arguments that rationalized the abandonment of patients in
previous epidemics include futility when medicine is
powerless to help and the depletion of finite resources when
physicians fall ill [3]. If obligations can be legitimized,
however, and if the medical profession as a whole does have
a societal duty, then to which individuals within the profession
does this responsibility fall? Some limits in the level of risk will
be needed for these obligations to be practically binding, and
society will need to question the extent to which doctors have
to endanger their lives for public good. There will inevitably be
reciprocal demands on society by such physicians who face
a disproportionate burden of risks. Barriers to the ability to
render aid need to be overcome with the appropriate
resources and planning. Standards of care may have to be
adjusted and the legal repercussions of these adjusted
standards need to be addressed. The present review will
confront all these issues in order to aid pandemic planning.
Obligations of the medical profession
The obligations of the medical profession in a medical emer-
gency revolve around the issues of rule of rescue, free choice
of profession and the profession’s contractual duties to
society.
Rule of rescue
The rule of rescue prevents the abandonment of those in
need of help and prompts a certain minimal decency that is
expected from all individuals who are in a position to render
aid at a time of crisis [4]. Clark has highlighted that the
obligation to assist at such a juncture involves four factors:
need, proximity, capability and last resort [5] (see also [6]).
The greater the need, the greater the responsibility to help;
therefore, the duties that physicians will have are in part
dictated by the extent of the need. If influenza does strike in
pandemic proportions, this need is likely to be tremendous.
The planning assumptions for a 1957-like moderate pan-
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demic estimates 45 million people seeking outpatient care in
the United States and 865,000 requiring hospitalization [7].
The number of people needing hospitalization would rise to
nearly 10 million, with about 1.5 million in an intensive care
setting, should a 1918-like severe pandemic strike [7].
Proximity refers to notice of expectations rather than to
physical space, and in this respect the medical profession’s
obligations stem from public expectations of the profession in
a crisis. These expectations are bound to the nature of the
profession’s contract with society. The international experi-
ence of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) out-
break suggests worldwide public expectation is that doctors
will respond by continuing to provide care in a pandemic
even if this involves elevated risks. Expectations also increase
when acceptable levels of excess risks are made explicit and
agreed upon in advance of the outbreak [8].
Capability is based on Kant’s principle of ‘ought implies can’.
In rendering aid during an infectious disease crisis, the
benefits that can be gained at the expense of the same risks
undertaken are much higher for physicians by virtue of the
expert knowledge they possess. This professional expertise
may also provide doctors with better self-protection in dealing
with any infection risks.
The last resort argument is that responsibility increases as the
probability that someone else can serve decreases. Unquali-
fied personnel without medical capabilities cannot provide
services such as diagnosis and treatment of disease. The
public will therefore have absolute reliance on healthcare
workers in an infectious disease emergency.
Free choice of profession
In freely joining a profession designed to combat disease,
doctors make an implicit commitment to some degree of occu-
pational risk [5,9]. Risks that are intrinsic to a profession are not
unique and are similar to the risks that firefighters and police
officers face in their line of work [4]. Indeed, the somewhat
mundane exposures to tuberculosis and seasonal influenza
already take an unaccounted toll on healthcare workers [8]. An
era of successful antibiotic development, effective public health
measures and the relatively long time gap since the last
pandemic (1968 to 1970), however, have resulted in a
generation of physicians entering the profession with little
thought regarding work-related risks and mortality [10].
The issue of having to provide care for patients with
contagious diseases for which there is limited treatment was
put sharply back in focus during the early years of the HIV
epidemic and during the 2003 SARS outbreak. With an
influenza pandemic looming as an imminent probability, all
physicians need to ask what sacrifices are demanded in the
name of their profession and what minimal standard of risk
would be acceptable in order to be able to continue working.
Free choice of the medical profession implies free choice of
accepting the associated occupational hazards. Ultimately, the
only way to avoid all such risks will be to change careers [8].
Contract with society
Society bestows upon the medical profession prestige and
guild-like powers of self-regulation [11]. These benefits are
arguably over and above the remuneration received from the
contractual obligations of providing healthcare. In return for
these benefits, the profession has made fiduciary commit-
ments to care for individuals who are compromised by the
misfortunes of disease [12]. These commitments are en-
shrined in classical professional ethics as values such as
beneficence and justice. Moreover, professional codes dating
back to the American Medical Association code of 1847
have repeatedly affirmed the moral duty to treat the sick
during pestilence despite personal risks [5]. As members of a
profession who have taken advantage of its contract with
society to reap social rewards, it is then onerous on
physicians to commit to the obligations of the profession
when called upon to do so [5]. This is the essence of John
Rawls’ ‘no free rider’ principle [13].
Individual obligations
With the obligations of the medical profession as a whole
established, on which individuals within the profession will this
burden fall [4]? Practitioners will inevitably be exposed to
differing levels of risk depending on the roles and responsi-
bilities assumed. Risk exposure should ideally be controlled by
distributing it such that those most prepared for risks would
then face the highest burden of risk exposure. Intensivists,
emergency physicians, anesthesiologists and pulmonologists
would therefore be obligated to face higher risks than other
specialists because their expertise will afford better protection
to cope with these increased risks. By being less likely to be
infected, these professionals will reduce further nosocomial
transmission and consequently protect the frontline medical
team better. The therapeutic interventions these specialists
can offer are also likely to be more beneficial.
Risk does not always respond to claims of fairness and is
unfortunately encountered by both choice and chance [14].
Professional and institutional solidarity is likely to play a role in
distributing these risks. The risk that is refused by any
individual physician is left to be absorbed by someone else. In
a crisis, this someone else does not become another
hypothetical doctor, but a known colleague [14].
Limits to risk
Expecting a physician to treat without any regard to his or her
own safety is both an extreme and unrealistic approach [5].
Reasonable limits to an acceptable level of risk are
necessary. Risks become reasonable when they are pro-
portional to the probability of successful rescue and when the
overall good that is achievable from undertaking that risk is
substantial [4]. Professional obligations can then be weighed
against competing personal obligations to health and families.Page 3 of 5
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The level of risks, the nature of risks and the ability to foresee
risks, as well as the magnitude of increased risks compared
with baseline levels, are issues that need to be addressed in
risk assessment [4]. The true level of risk in pandemic
influenza is unknown because this is a virus in evolution [15].
We only have historical evidence from previous pandemics
and experience with smaller seasonal outbreaks. The
estimated case fatality in the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic was
2.5%, which is more than 20-fold higher than seasonal
outbreaks [16]. More alarmingly, the fatality rate in human
cases of H5N1 avian influenza, which is a prime candidate for
the next disease pandemic, is greater than 50% [7].
The nature of the risk spans more than personal morbidity
and mortality, but also includes transmission to family
members. Prevention of transmission to loved ones may be a
higher priority for healthcare workers than self-protection
against infection [17]. In the most severe cases, the
predicted nature of influenza infection is that of rapidly
progressing respiratory distress and multiorgan failure with a
high mortality rate [15].
The suspected cyclic pattern of antigen shift suggests that
the next outbreak is not only predictable, but is in fact
imminent [18]. An influenza pandemic is therefore not a
hypothetical crisis but a foreseeable one.
Finally, if pandemic influenza should strike, the risks to all
healthcare workers may dramatically increase in magnitude
from the baseline level of occupational risk. This increased risk
will impact hardest those who work in the frontlines of
emergency rooms and primary care. The SARS outbreak
showed that a large proportion of the second wave of victims
was healthcare workers who were inadvertently infected
before the realization of a new infectious disease outbreak [2].
The infection risk to medical professionals therefore becomes
part of the baseline risks assumed by all who continue to
provide frontline healthcare. After a case definition was
established for SARS and infection control was instituted, the
transmission among healthcare workers fell precipitously [19].
The infections in the healthcare profession that followed were
attributable to either lapse in infection control or to close
contact during high-risk pulmonary aerosol-generating
procedures [20]. The actual increased risk incurred after the
outbreak was identified and the infection control instituted was
relatively small.
Therefore, pandemic influenza imposes foreseeable high
risks to physicians with the potential consequence of
mortality. Survey data suggest that 24% of physicians find it
acceptable to abandon their workplace during such a
pandemic in order to protect themselves and their families
[21]. These risks must therefore be significantly mitigated
and compensated for by societal and institutional support to
ensure adequate turnout of the medical workforce (see
Table 1).
Societal/institutional support
When confronted with increased risk in the line of duty, it
would be fair for physicians to demand that protective equip-
ment and psychologically sustainable working conditions are
available [14]. Approaching risks with caution is not the same
as refusing to treat [22]. International experience with SARS
confirms that, with adequate protective equipment, most
healthcare professionals continued to turn up for work.
Availability of personal protection will reduce ill-conceived
heroism whereby doctors fall ill by rushing to treat victims
unprotected. These ill doctors will compound the crisis by
concurrently increasing the numbers who need treatment and
decreasing those who can provide care [5,12]. Priority to
healthcare workers in vaccine and chemoprophylaxis alloca-
tion as well as adequate protective equipment is therefore
justified by the principles of optimizing effectiveness and
maximizing benefits. These reciprocal demands for logistics
support by physicians need to be proportional to the extent of
risk faced in order to facilitate a just distribution of scarce
resources [23].
Identifying and overcoming the barriers that impede the ability
of physicians to provide care during a crisis must be the
cornerstone of pandemic resource planning. Training in
protective equipment and infection control, mask fitting and
policy awareness are pre-emptive measures that cannot be
delayed until the onset of a pandemic. Clear expectations
regarding their specific role in an emergency may increase
staff turnout in the initial chaos and confusion surrounding a
pandemic [17]. Perhaps insisting on every physician having a
family emergency plan that outlines how the family will
function in a pandemic should be part of annual performance
reviews and hiring decisions [17]. Logistical support that will
be needed for physicians’ other childcare/eldercare obliga-
tions and transportation/lodging needs have to be addressed
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Table 1
Issues related to healthcare workers in pandemic planning
1. Availability of personal protective equipment
2. Vaccine and chemoprophylaxis allocation
3. Training in protective equipment and infection control
4. Policy awareness and roles/expectations in an emergency
5. Psychologically sustainable working conditions
6. Emergency plans for the family, including childcare and eldercare
7. Transportation to work
8. Lodging
9. Financial compensation for risks and extra hours
10. Sickness/death benefits
11. Liability protection for altered standards of care
12. Objective triage criteria and independent triage teamsbefore a crisis [17]. Realistic financial incentives for the extra
risk and hours have to be worked out, and predictable
compensation must be available to the families of those who
succumb to disease [2]. Survey data suggest that the degree
of institutional preparedness for a potential pandemic is a
strong predictor of individual healthcare professional
preparedness [24].
Doctor–patient relationship
Standards of care that will be considered acceptable will
probably change in a crisis. Doctors must reconcile their
instincts to provide good care with inevitable delays in
resuscitation codes in order to suit up in personal protective
equipment [14]. The ability to perform emergency medical
procedures such as endotracheal intubation will also be
hampered by the cumbersome nature of such protective
equipment. Physicians are not an inexhaustible resource,
however, and should weigh the future benefits that a healthy
doctor can provide against the good that can be done
immediately [25]. Consequently, an influenza pandemic may
reach such proportions that expected standards of care may
be lowered. Resuscitation codes may be even abandoned
because the low probability of success may not justify the risk
exposure to healthcare professionals. Doctors will need
institutional support and liability protection in making such
judgments in difficult situations.
Physicians may also have to relinquish the principle of the
primacy of an individual patient’s needs when confronted with
demands of allocation of scarce recourses. With rising health
budgets and constrained resources, there is already an
acknowledgement of physicians’ obligations to society
through just and prudent resource distribution even in the
absence of a pandemic. The need for triage and resource
allocation will inevitably strain the doctor–patient relationship.
The obligations to the patient at the bedside inevitably appear
more pressing than the obligations to the yet to be admitted
patient waiting at the Emergency Department. Development
of objective triage/allocation criteria and having teams
independent of the attending medical team to make triage
decisions will alleviate some of these conflicts.
Conclusion
The obligation of the medical profession to provide treatment
in an influenza pandemic stems from the expertise that
physicians uniquely possess. This expertise enables doctors
to provide care that the general public would not be able to
provide. Free choice of profession and the profession’s
contract with society affirms this obligation. Within the
profession, the duty will fall on those who are most qualified
because they will both provide the most effective care and
also be able to protect themselves best. This obligation to
treat is not binding against infinite risks, but comes instead
with risks that can to some extent be mitigated and managed.
Institutional and societal support must be available and
proportionate to the increased burden of risks to overcome
the many barriers to the ability to treat [26]. Although no clear
distinction between supererogation and duty can be made
without the experience of the actual circumstances of the
pandemic, the present review has highlighted the issues that
will be considered in defining these boundaries when an
outbreak strikes.
Physicians must be able to overcome their personal fears
regarding infection risks and must commit to coming forward
in the face of surging medical demands because they will
need to lead a myriad of other essential healthcare workers
who will have less understanding, less luxury of choice and
less social/economic reward than doctors [14]. This obliga-
tion is neither an unrealized or uncompensated burden that
the medical profession shoulders [5]. Soft penalties include
loss of professional esteem and autonomy. The limitation of
legal enforcement of duties is that it enables only a bare
minimum expectation to be demanded, which is unlikely to
suffice [8]. Without a strong and positive response, influenza
will run its course undiagnosed, unconfined and untreated,
leaving entire populations ravaged – and then history will
judge physicians harshly [2].
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